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This paper studies whether Swedish fertility swings and variation in public expenditure for children are related 
events. In the 1930s Swedish birth rates had fallen to levels close to the death rates and in public discourse this 
was perceived as a major social and national crisis, spurring a range of social policy reforms. While total fertility 
rates in Sweden have varied over large spans the completed cohort fertility rates are almost constant around 2 
children per woman for women born in the 20
th century. Using unique data for the years 1930-1997 on public 
expenditure per eligible child for schools, child allowances and child care we estimate age-specific fertility for 
broad age groups as a function of these variables. The results indicate that the age group 25-29 is most sensitive 
to variations in this public expenditure thus providing a tentative explanation of the swings in period fertility in 
terms of policy induced tempo variation. School expenditure is negatively correlated to fertility while child care 
and child allowance is positively correlated. This pattern is consistent with a quantity-quality trade-off by the 
parents. To check the predictive power of the model we use data from 1998-2007 and get an excellent prediction 
of the fertility turn-around after 1999 for all age groups except 35 and above where we tend to under-predict at 




Artikeln studerar huruvida svenska svängningar i fruktsamheten och variation i offentliga utgifter riktade till 
barn är relaterade händelser. På 1930-talet hade svenska födelsetal sjunkit till nivåer nära dödstalen och i den 
offentliga debatten uppfattades detta som en större social och nationell kris som gav upphov till en rad reformer i 
socialpolitiken. Medan den summerade fruktsamheten på årsbas har varierat över breda intervall har den 
fullbordade kohortfruktsamheten varit nästan konstant runt två barn per kvinna under 1900-talet. Med unika data 
för åren 1930-1997 på offentliga utgifter per barn i de relevanta åldersgrupperna för skola, barnbidrag och 
barnomsorg skattar vi den åldersspecifika fruktsamheten som en funktion av dessa variabler. Resultaten pekar på 
att åldersgruppen 25-29 är mycket känsligare för variationer i dessa utgifter. Därmed blir sådana variationer 
också en möjlig orsak till de förändringar i periodfruktsamheten som sker till följd av tidigareläggning eller 
senareläggning av barnafödandet som följd av politikförändringar. Skolutgifter är negativt korrelerat med 
fruktsamheten medan barnbidrag och barnomsorg samvarierar positivt med fruktsamheten. Det är ett mönster 
som är konsistent med en kvalitets-kvantitetsmodell av fruktsamheten där föräldrar väger antalet barn mot 
kvaliteten (omsorgen) ägnad åt barnen. Modellen valideras genom projektioner utanför skattningstidpunkten och 
ger utmärkta prediktioner av den vändpunkt i fruktsamhetstrenden som äger rum efter 1999 för alla 
åldersgrupper med ett visst undantag för de över 35 där den faktiska utvecklingen under 2000-talet varit 
snabbare än prediktionen och därmed underskattar fruktsamhetsutvecklingen på 10-årshorisonten. Fortsatt 
forskning kring dessa relationer är nödvändigt för att klarlägga orsaksmekanismerna bakom dessa mycket stabila 
korrelationer. 
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While in most countries decreasing period fertility has been associated also with 
a decreasing desired number of children and decreasing completed fertility rates, Sweden so 
far seems to be an exception. Swedish completed cohort fertility rates are close to 2 for all 
cohorts born since the 1890s, although the period total fertility rate has fluctuated between 2.6 
in 1945 and 1.5 in 1999. In this paper we study the hypothesis that these swings have their 
roots in variations in social policy that affect the timing of births rather than the quantum of 
fertility.  
The hypothesis implies that fertility in different age groups must be interacting 
differently with changes in public policy. Our approach here is to study the variation in age-
specific fertility and in public expenditure per eligible child over a long period of time. 
Although the different kinds of public expenditure on children (school, child allowances and 
childcare) cannot be expected to completely explain individual fertility behavior it should be 
noted that these expenditures also reflect family policies, public and social attitudes and 
norms regarding children. We establish that there are stable correlations between public child 
expenditure and age-specific fertility. These correlations conform to theoretical expectations 
with respect to sign although in this context a causal interpretation would most likely be 
mistaken. However, we validate the stability of the model by out-of-sample projection.  
Thanks to a generational analysis performed at the Swedish Ministry of Finance 
(Pettersson et al. 2006) we have access to age-specific estimates of public transfers and public 
consumption back to 1930 that we use to study this issue. We are able to estimate not only 
stable correlations of public policies with the variations of the total fertility rate but also find 
different regression coefficients for women at different ages during the period 1930-1997. Our 
results show that, consistent with theory, public school expenditure, which lowers quality 
costs for parents, has a negative correlation with fertility while child care and child 
allowances, which offsets female opportunity costs and lower quantity costs of children, has a 
positive association to fertility. Moreover, it turns out that the estimated models have strong 
predictive power also for the 10-year out-of-sample period after 1997. 
Below replacement fertility has become a global demographic reality in the 21
st 
century. In all industrially developed countries period fertility
1 (TFR) is either below the 
 
1 I.e. the total fertility rate which is the sum of the age-specific fertility rates in a given year. 
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natural rate of reproduction of about 2.1 children per woman or balancing just at the border. 
In conjunction with decreasing mortality rates at high ages this leads to rapidly aging 
populations and increasing dependency rates. This in turn leads to well founded concerns 
regarding the future sustainability of social security and care systems for the elderly. It is 
important to note that sustainability of the elderly welfare systems may well require 
investment in support systems for the young to relax economic constraints on childbearing 
and education. Although we do not believe that there is a direct link between child 
expenditure changes to individual behavior our work may still be useful for designing policies 
to balance a given society’s rate of reproduction and education at levels consistent with future 
demands on the support base for elderly welfare. This level may well be below reproduction 
rates given other concerns like environmental pressures and depletion of natural resources but 
it cannot be too low if future generations shall be able to satisfy demands for elderly care and 
health care. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section a brief literature review is 
provided and a discussion of a few important theoretical contributions to the enormous 
literature on the determinants of fertility. After that follows a section with some background 
facts from Sweden in order to set the stage. Data and model considerations are presented in 
the fourth section. Section five reports the empirical results. Section six is devoted to a 
discussion of the results and conclusions.  
 
2 Some relevant studies and theories 
 
The reasons for decreasing fertility vary across countries and cover economic, 
social, cultural and attitudinal factors. One of the most mentioned potential causes is the 
increased labor force participation of women and the conflict between motherhood and career. 
Yet in a recent article Feyrer et al. (2008) noted that the previously negative country cross-
section correlation between female market work and fertility in the last decades has switched 
to positive. They suggest that higher degrees of gender equality aided by public policy are 
explaining why countries with high female labor force participation also have higher fertility. 
While this may be true in some sense for explaining country differences, we would from a 
Swedish vantage point argue that gender equality could as well be a consequence of public 
policy rather than a cause. The European experience rather points to gender equality as an 
outcome of policies that facilitate the combination of work and children (Ferrarini, 2006). The 
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cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses of Myrskylä et al (2009) suggest that, at advanced 
levels of development, there is a threshold value of the Human Development Index
2 where 
the combined social and economic influences on fertility actually reverse the trend of fertility 
decline. Institutional settings and social policies that facilitate social and economic 
development in terms of social security, individual welfare, and human capital accumulation, 
thus may play a role for the reversal of previous trends in the demographic transition.  
Job insecurity and economic uncertainty are also often believed to be important 
reasons for low fertility, especially during economic crises. These problems may be mitigated 
by government intervention, for example by providing reasonable maternity benefits, free or 
inexpensive child care facilities, flexible employment, and so on (Caldwell et al, 2002). 
Although cross-country studies has led some scholars to believe that government expenditures 
aiming at raising fertility has achieved little or nothing, studies based on specific countries, 
such as the Nordic countries and some Eastern European countries, give a different picture 
(Avdeev and Monnier, 1995; Hoem and Hoem, 1996; Ferrarini, 2006). The social policy 
framework differs significantly across the industrialized countries. There are studies  that 
emphasize the role of the long-standing differences in social and economic institutions in 
shaping the diverse social and demographic outcomes among the European countries (for 
example Billari and Philipov, 2004). Ferrarini (2006) attributed the much more damped 
downward fertility trend in Scandinavian countries to the interference with social policies 
promoting dual-earner families. A series of Swedish studies focusing mainly on individual 
childbearing decisions (Sundström, 1991; Bernhardt, 1991, 1993; Hoem, 1990, 2000) suggest 
that both the relatively high fertility in Sweden and its fluctuations during the latest decades 
should be attributed largely to  family policies that focus on the compatibility of family 
activities and the labor-force participation of women and men. Most of these studies are based 
on data at the individual level and focus mainly on the effect of one type of social policy 
while assuming the effects of other policies as exogenous. This is an appropriate methodology 
at the individual level, but at the macro level such assumptions are hard to defend. Since our 
study concerns behavior at the national macro level rather than individual behavior we will 
focus on the measurable co-variation of social policies and period fertility over a long period 
of time. This does not imply that we discard the importance of social, cultural or attitudinal 
 
2 The HDI is the equally weighted sum of three indexes for life expectancy ((life expectancy at birth minus 25 
divided by (85-25)), education (2/3*ALI+1/3*GEI, where ALI is an adult literacy index and GEI is a gross 
enrollment index)d and a GDP index (log(GDP per capita/100) divided by log(40000/100). 
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factors, but since our data measure the economic impact of policies, our interpretation will be 
guided by economically based theories.  
There are three main economic theories about fertility change in industrialized 
countries. One is the theory of relative economic deprivation which was advanced by 
Easterlin (1969). The other is the theory proposed by e.g. Becker (1960, 1981) and others 
about rising opportunity costs of childbearing associated with increased female-male relative 
wages, and third, the theory about a trade off between children’s quality and quantity (Becker 
and Lewis 1973). The latter two theories are often combined. 
Easterlin’s cohort crowding hypothesis has a strong social dimension in 
assuming that young people acquire their consumption aspirations by the standard their 
parents can afford as they grow up. When faced with the labor market as young adults they 
then base their fertility decisions on whether they believe they can afford the same 
consumption standard if they get a child. Large cohorts will tend to meet less favorable labor 
market conditions than smaller cohorts because young and old labor is imperfectly 
substitutable.  
Empirically the Easterlin Hypothesis has a rather checkered past in the literature 
that to some extent may be due to lack of relevant data. It is hard to obtain accurate measures 
of the consumption aspirations that Easterlin posit. While US data show evidence of cohort 
crowding in terms of increasing spread between wages for older and younger workers as a 
baby boom enters the labor market, this does not show up in for example Swedish data where 
rather the opposite is found. The link to fertility seems even more fragile although see 
Macunovich (1996) for a more positive view. One reason could be that in many countries 
policy responses to cohort-crowding and low fertility may obscure the links that Easterlin 
refers to. 
Obviously the Swedish experience would be hard to directly reconcile with the 
Easterlin hypothesis since the fertile cohorts are fairly large also when TFR is high. However, 
the completed fertility rate (CFR) is actually at its lowest level for the very large cohorts born 
before World War II and there is a weak tendency that the 1940s cohorts had fewer children 
than those born in the 1930s and 1950s. It is quite dubious whether this can be tied to 
variation in the relative wages of male youngsters relative to their parental generation. Rather 
the 1940s cohort has done better in most respects than their parental generation, although this 
is very much the result of a rapid expansion of education (Ohlsson 1986, Dahlberg and 
Nahum 2003). Increasing female education would indeed have a similar effect on fertility. In 
any case the data we have will not allow for observing this effect.  
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Becker (1960) and Willis (1973) are two of the most important contributions to 
the so called New Home Economics. This approach emphasizes the household production 
aspect of having and raising children. Since females are conventionally assumed to take a 
larger share of household work (and empirically also do so) fertility decreases with the 
relative female/male market wage, ceteris paribus, since this raises the opportunity cost of 
household work. Since female education is a key component in raising the female relative 
wage increases in female education should contribute more than male education to lower 
fertility. This then opens an alternative way for education expenditure to give a negative effect 
on fertility, different from the quantity-quality trade-off below. Public support by cash 
allowances offsets part of the quantity cost as well as the opportunity cost. Subsidized child 
care substantially decrease the opportunity cost of female labor force participation. 
The quantity-quality tradeoff (Becker and Lewis 1973) in fertility builds on a 
non-linear budget restriction where the quantity cost associated with the number of children 
multiplied by the quality costs for better education and upbringing tends to yield a strong 
substitution effect at rising incomes. Given that the income elasticity is higher for quality than 
for quantity this substitution effect is strong enough to offset the positive income effect on 
number of children, i.e. quantity, entirely. Thus higher income levels will be associated with 
decreasing fertility as incomes rise and shadow prices of the quantity of children rise. From a 
policy perspective this motivates making a difference between subsidies that mainly affect the 
parents’ cost for quality (e.g. education subsidies) and subsidies that mainly decrease the cost 
for quantity, like housing and daycare subsidies that like cash allowances decreases quantity 
costs. The latter will be expected to have positive effects on fertility by offsetting quantity 
cost. Reducing quality costs on the other hand induces an increase in the level of quality 
investment, “which in turn induces an increase in the shadow price of quantity (…) and thus a 
relatively large decrease in quantity.”(Becker and Lewis 1973, p. S283).  
Most of the existing studies about fertility variation in Sweden are based on 
individual data. To our knowledge, Löfström and Westerberg (2006) and Stanfors (2005) 
might be the only time series studies in recent years that try to find the factors at the macro-
level behind the fertility swings in Sweden. Löfström and Westerberg focus on a relatively 
short period 1965-1998. They find that increasing numbers of female students and increasing 
divorce rates were negatively associated with the TFR of the subsequent years, while the 
changes in female labor force participation, child allowance, and the childcare benefits had a 
positive but more sluggish effect. Stanfors (2005) studies the period from 1915 up to 2000 
and finds evidence consistent with Easterlin’s relative income hypothesis. She also finds 
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evidence for the New Home Economics prediction that increasing relative female wages will 
affect fertility negatively. Moreover, Swedish fertility tends to be countercyclical before 1975 
and becomes procyclical after that, most likely due to the introduction of parental leave 
insurance having made it more attractive to have children in good labor markets.  
Hoem and Hoem (1996) discuss the issue from a family policy perspective.
3 
They do not formally test any hypothesis but informally discuss how one may interpret the 
ups and downs in Swedish fertility as responses to general economic conditions and family 
policy reforms. They draw the conclusion that there is a strong underlying social norm of 2 
children per family and that people are adapting fertility behavior to surrounding conditions 
by changes in timing rather than any change in the quantum of fertility. Björklund (2006) 
studies cohort fertility for women born 1925-1958 in a cross-national approach with eight 
other countries and comes to essentially the same conclusions. 
Heckman and Walker (1990) also study Swedish cohort fertility (with data from 
a fertility survey in 1981) and note that correlations to aggregate female wage data weaken for 
the younger cohorts. One explanation is that these cohorts have been more exposed to 
substantial increases in parental-leave benefits and child care subsidies. Tasiran (1995) adds 
micro data on wages to the same data and finds the correlation to female wages even more 
fragile. 
 
3 Background: Fertility swings and social policy evolution 
 
Figure 1 presents the period total fertility rate of Swedish women since 1930. 
Sweden was one of the forerunners in the world where the fertility fell below the replacement 
level throughout the 1930s and early 1940s. Then the period TFR jumped back briefly to a 
peak of 2.6 in 1945 and thereafter remained above replacement level for about two decades up 
to a peak in the mid-1960s; followed in the 1970s again by another period of below 
replacement level fertility until the mid-1980s. Then period TFR rose to 2.1 in 1990 and 
declined again through the late 1990s to an all time low of 1.5 in 1999 and is in 2007 up to 1.9 
again. No other country seems to exhibit such regular and strong swings although similar—
but much weaker—echo effects can be observed in some other countries as baby boomers 
come into their fertile period. The short and very regular span of booms and busts, each 
lasting about a decade, is, however, peculiar to Sweden.  
 
3 They also provide a very useful calendarium dating family policy reforms from the 1930s up to 1997. 
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Figure 1 Total fertility rates for women in Sweden 1930-2007 



































Figure 2 Cohort total fertility rate for Swedish women born 1876-1957.  
Source: The same as Figure 1.  
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The completed fertility rates (Figure 2) for women born between the 1910s and 
early 1950s remain rather stable and vary slightly between 1.8 and 2.2. Note that the 
reproductive life span of these women covers mainly the period between the 1930s and the 
mid-1990s when the period TFRs vary significantly more and regularly. This indicates that 
the quasi-cyclicality is mainly due to tempo effects where the age pattern of giving birth 
changes over time. The changes in the timing of childbearing during this period are apparent 
in the yearly age-specific fertility
4 since 1930. 
Figure 3 shows a clear trend of fertility decrease since the mid-1960s for women 
below age 25. In contrast, the fertility of women in their thirties increases significantly since 
the late 1970s, although with a temporary drop during the late 1990s. The fertility of women 
in ages 30-34 even reached a historically high level in the early 2000s when for the first time 
in the period the birth rate in this group surpassed that of the 25-29 age group. This pattern 
indicates a clear trend of fertility postponement among younger women and a relatively strong 








































Figure 3 Age-specific fertility of Swedish women during 1930-2007.  
Source: The same as Figure 1.  
 
The age-specific fertilities over time also reveal that each of the fertility peaks 
since the 1930s resulted from fertility increases of women at different ages. The peak of the 
                                                 
4 More precisely the average fertility for the annual cohorts within the designated age span. 
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mid-1940s was associated with a fertility increase of women at all ages. The following 
fertility decrease mainly involved women after age 25 while fertility of below 25 women was 
stable or increased. The fertility increase of the mid-1960s was mainly achieved by women 
below age 30, and the fertility decline afterward also occurred mainly among these women. 
The peak of the late 1980s and the early 1990s resulted mainly from fertility increases among 
women at ages 25-39, while the fertility of women at ages 20-24 had only a mild increase. In 
contrast to the previous peaks, the fertility increase since the early 2000s is almost exclusively 







































Figure 4 Age-specific fertility of women of some European countries during 2000-2005. 
Source: UNPD, World Population Prospects, 2008 Revision. 
 
There exists a strong tendency of fertility decrease among women at younger 
ages in both Sweden and other industrialized countries. The decreases in fertility at early ages, 
however, are offset to a large extent by increases at older ages in Sweden. Although there are 
fertility increases at older ages also in other European countries, the degree of increase is 
lower than that of Sweden. As shown by Figure 4, the fertility of Swedish women at ages 
below 30 was lower than in many other countries during 2005-2010 when the TFR of Sweden 
had recovered from a historical low level of 1.5 in 1999. The fertility of Swedish women at 
ages after 30 was, however, higher than the fertility of their counterparts in other European 
countries.  
10 
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The evolution of social policies in Sweden from 1930 and forward is a rather 
gradual process where protection and support for mothers and children is introduced in a 
piecewise manner with rather frequent changes and extensions (see appendix for more 
details). Looking at Figure 5 we see, however, that there is a marked increase, almost a 
doubling of public consumption per child towards the end of the 1930s. Cash transfers start 
increasing in connection to the introduction of universal child allowances 1948. The public 












1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Public consumption by children (per cap) Public child transfers (per cap)  
Figure 5 Public transfers and government consumption on average per child in millions of 1997 SEK 
1930-1997. Computed from data provided by Pettersson et al. 2006. 
 
In the 1940s not much happens during the war but the military draft of young 
males provides an increasing female labor demand.
5 After the end of the war it also did so 
except for women below 25. Sweden is therefore one of the few countries where TFR peaks 
in 1945 and then falls. The 1960s are golden years in Sweden with high growth rates and 
rapid urbanization and the big cohorts from the 1940s enter their reproductive period. In the 
1970s economic problems and crises are common, but nevertheless public child related 
expenditure increases quickly.  
At a first view it therefore seems reasonable to assume that the 1940s baby 
boom is associated with a general expansion of public consumption (other age groups have a 
                                                 
5 Stanfors (2005) demonstrate a strong upward trend in female/male relative wages within manufacturing during 
the 1940s. This should have damped fertility and indeed she finds that with controls for cohort size and business 
cycle conditions, a negative relation to TFR is estimated. 
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similar pattern as the children in Figure 5). The fertility decline among women above age 25 
after the world war may be associated with the rapid increase in the female/male wage rate. 
The baby boom in the 1960s may be associated with the introduction of maternity benefits in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s, as well as steadily increasing government expenditure in 
conjunction with very high growth rates in the economy and the introduction of extensive 
housing subsidies in the 1960s. The economic crises in the 1970s in conjunction with 
increased higher education and higher female labor force participation are associated with 
decreasing fertility rates especially for women below age 30, but increasing subsidies and full 
employment probably help to raise fertility again in the end of the 1980s. This development is 
interrupted by the crisis in the beginning of the 1990s and a rapid increase in the average age 
at first birth from 26 around 1990 to 29 in 2007. Fertility hits bottom at 1.5 in 1999. 
Intuitively at first look it thus seems that the hypothesis of a public policy interaction with 
TFR variation by tempo variation should be given some credibility in the Swedish context. 
As theory warns different kinds of public consumption may have opposite 
effects on fertility. Increasing subsidies to education may decrease fertility by quantity-quality 
substitution, as well as intrusion of higher education into the prime reproductive period. 
Increased female education leads to higher opportunity and career costs from child birth. On 
top of that much of the labor demand from the expansion of the public sector was satisfied by 
increased female labor supply. The negative fertility effect from this was, however, partly 
offset by deliberate policies to increase female labor participation by generous parental leave 
provision, coupled with abandoning the previous co-taxation of married couples, expansion of 
the public child care, etc. 
4 Data and model considerations 
 
We first need to consider how macro data on period fertility and public child expenditures 
relate to the theory that is centered on individual micro behavior. A contemporary correlation 
between the dependent and the independent macro variables can arise for several different 
reasons none of which need imply a causal connection at the individual level. Both variables 
may be tied to some underlying third factor, or follow common trends. Restrictions in the 
environment (e.g. budget restrictions, see Becker 1962) may force a common macro behavior 
even if individuals are quite unaware of it. It may even be a pure coincidence. A parental 
decision to conceive a child has a waiting time of at least and often more than 9 months. Thus 
it may seem reasonable to expect a lag structure of the independent variables rather than 
12 
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contemporary values to influence decisions, but that is not necessarily the case. Some policy 
changes may be anticipated and indeed even caused by previous fertility development thus 
creating endogeneity problems at the macro level. Social network effects and attitudinal 
change can be expected to reinforce fertility tendencies in both directions thus tending to 
create serial correlation in the fertility variables.  
For all the “independent” variables related to public child expenditure the size of child cohorts 
will affect the unit costs in one way or another; nominal cash allowances tend to lose value by 
inflation which in turn is affected by the age structure influence on supply and demand (Lindh 
and Malmberg, 1998); political decisions are influenced by observed period fertility. This 
implies a dynamically complex structure with macro feedbacks where also expectations of 
e.g. future crowding in school and child care may affect parental decisions. It would be rather 
naive to take macro correlations in a time series as evidence for a policy impact directly on 
the individual level. Such evidence can only come from well designed micro studies. 
We also need to consider the kind of data that we have available. Although we 
have fairly long time series it is annual data so the degrees of freedom are limited. We simply 
cannot expect to disentangle the complex dynamics described above in a structural model 
approach so our study sets the more limited goal to study whether a reduced model is 
consistent with our hypothesis rather than formally testing it against all relevant alternatives. 
In order to validate the model we therefore do not primarily rely on conventional statistical 
hypothesis tests as we know beforehand that some of the assumptions these tests rely on are 
likely to be violated. Instead we test the predictive ability of the model out-of-sample. While 
this approach cannot prove a causal relation it does provide evidence of the stability of the 
estimated correlations. Given the data we have (see below) a simple regression model is 
 (1)  ∑ ∑ ∑ + + + + + = − − −
mn
t t n t n m t m
k
k t k t X e c a y ε η δ γ β α0  
where  y is the fertility variable, a is child allowances per eligible child, c is child care 
expenditure per eligible child, and e is compulsory school expenditure per eligible child. 
Control variables (if any are needed) are in the vector X. 
 
Since there are minor differences in the different available series for fertility 
variables we decided to use fertility data from the Human Fertility Data Base (Max Planck 
Institute for Demographic Research) in order to have consistently computed fertility rates 
over the whole period 1930-2007.  
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Data on age-specific public transfers and consumption 1930-1997 has 
generously been provided by the Ministry of Finance. During the period 1968-1997 these data 
are based on the LINDA register data base.
6 Pettersson et al. (2006) have extended a sample 
of these data backwards to 1930 by using a pseudo-cohort approach and available 
information. Thus there is a marked difference in the quality of individual data before and 
after 1968 but the aggregated data that we use have been calibrated to reflect real information 
from National Accounts and other available sources; for example: income distribution, 
censuses and household surveys. The data on transfers and public consumption were 
originally attributed at the household level and then equally divided on individuals of different 
ages in the household leading to somewhat absurd consequences such as 80 year olds being 
attributed child allowances and so on. For our purposes, transfer and consumption 
components that could be directly tied to children have been reallocated to children within the 
eligible age intervals (see Figure 6). This was feasible for school expenditure from 1930, child 
allowances from 1948 (when they were introduced) and public child care from 1964 (when 
formal public child care was introduced). 
For an out-of-sample test we have added to this corresponding data for 1998-
2007 using official aggregate data divided by the number of eligible children in the population 
and ratio linked to the first mentioned series.
7  
Pre-testing of the data for child expenditure as well as the fertility variables 
showed that the hypothesis of a unit root in the series could not be rejected for practically all 
series. Thus a regression with level variables may yield spurious results. Hence a first action 
was to difference all variables and start studying the lag structure. Thus equation (1) refers to 
differenced variables y, a ,  c and e. Exploratory regressions using the TFR as dependent 
variable and different lag structures show the theoretically expected signs (see further below). 
There are a number of estimation problems though:  
1.  For obvious reasons structural breaks appear in the years when child 
allowance (1948) and public child care (1964) are introduced. 
2.  Serial correlation in the residuals tends to be high for several years back. 
3.  Evidence of bidirectional lag interactions may be causing endogeneity 
bias (correlation of right hand variables and residuals). 
 
6 LINDA is a longitudinal sample of individual data maintained at a level comprising three percent of the 
Swedish population. Register data on households, income etc. has been collected for a wide range of variables 
(Edin and Fredriksson 2000). In fact the data also includes 1998, though the sample we got access to ended in 
1997. 
7 The data were collected with the help of Charlotte Thulstrup at the Institute for Futures Studies. 
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4.  Kurtosis in the residuals (wide tails in the distribution) indicates that 

















child allowances per eligible child child care subsidies per eligible child
mandatory school expenditure per eligible child
1997
 
Figure 6 Expenditure on child support: mandatory education, child allowances and child care subsidies. 
All in 1997 SEK per eligible child. Computed from Pettersson et al. 2006. 1998-2007 are computed from 
aggregate numbers by the authors.  
 
Our aim here is neither to maximize the fit of the regression, nor let formal 
hypothesis tests determine whether the public expenditure variables cause individuals to take 
a decision to have a child. We can and do test for statistical anomalies and sensitivity, 
however. In time series with limited degrees of freedom it is all too easy to over-fit models by 
estimation of too many parameters. On one hand, this means that we can not control for all 
possible direct and indirect plausible variables. On the other hand we do not want to estimate 
correlations that hinge on the influence of a few outlier values or are biased by correlation of 
the dependent variables and the residuals.  
Although our ultimate goal is the estimation of coefficients for age-specific 
fertility as a function of public child expenditures we start off with total fertility rates in order 
to find a specification that avoids or at least diminish the estimation problems mentioned 
above. If we performed this specification search for each age-specific fertility variable we 
might end up with different specifications where it would be hard to discern whether 
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differences in the coefficients for public child expenditures are significant and real or depends 
on differences in the specification. 
 
5 Results 
Exploratory regressions with TFR 
Exploring the lag structure as noted above showed potential estimation 
problems. Below is briefly described the actions this led us to. 
In the regressions with changes in TFR as dependent variable that are presented 
in Table 1 level shifts were added in 1948 and 1964 (both turned out negative) to deal with 
the structural break in trend introduced by new policies. Level shifts were introduced also in 
1973 (positive) when the modern parental leave insurance and other reforms
8 took place, and 
also from 1992-1997 (negative) when the crisis changed the Swedish labor market structure. 
Note that level shifts in the differenced specification are to be interpreted as a shift in the 
linear trend slope.  
Persistent autocorrelation in the residuals does not bias the coefficient estimates 
per se but it does lead to biased estimates of standard errors. Estimated standard errors are 
therefore in all tables corrected allowing for up to 5 lags by the Newey and West (1987) 
procedure for estimation of robust covariance matrices. 
Bi-directional “causality” was detected as well. To deal with potential 
endogeneity and simultaneity instrumented models were estimated. Child care expenditure 
and school expenditure were reasonably well predicted (
2 R  around 0.25) using the first 5 lags 
of the independent variables, the level shifts and the first 5 lags of the dependent variable 
(except in the lag model in col. 4 where lags of the change in TFR were dropped). Child 
allowance, however, turned out to be non-predictable by the instruments in the first-stage 
regressions and was therefore left as exogenous. As shown by the significance level of the 
Jarque-Bera statistic normality of the residuals was not rejected in the instrumented models. 
The level shifts are significant in the instrumented regressions. In the GMM 
estimation without lag where over-identifying restrictions are optimized (see Hansen 1982) 
also the policy variables become significant at the 1 percent level. The instrument restrictions 
are not rejected by Hansen’s J-test. 
                                                 
8 For example, divorce laws were liberalized and co-taxation of labor income was abandoned raising female 
opportunity costs for household production. This changed the general constraints on household bargaining and 
should also have an effect on fertility decisions. 
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To give an interpretation of the coefficients note that the variables are entered as 
fractions of a million SEK. Thus an increase by 10  000 SEK in for example child care 
expenditure per child per year in the first column is associated with an increase in TFR of 
around 0.04. The same amount in school expenditure decreases fertility by 0.08. Increasing 
child allowance with 10  000 SEK is associated with an increase of 0.18 in TFR. Child 
allowances are actually on this level since the 1980s. 
Under the assumption that the coefficients could be considered marginal effects, 
the combined effect of public expenditure for children almost cancelled in 1997 (about 0.02) 
and in 2007 would be quite strong (about 1.0). The trend in TFR 1997 was hence (including 
the level shifts) clearly negative and in 2007 strongly positive. That it was negative in 1997 is 
information that was used to estimate the coefficients but the positive trend in 2007 is an out-
of-sample prediction. In Figure 7 we see that the predictions out-of-sample of the period TFR 
according to the model in column 3 are quite accurate. The lag model in column 4 yield very 
similar projections although the coefficients of the policy variables are less statistically 
significant. 
 
Table 1 Regressions with instrumental variables of the change in TFR 1930-1997. Absolute t-
values below coefficients in parentheses 
Dep var. ΔTFR  OLS  IV (2SLS)  GMM(no lag)  GMM (w lag) 
        
Constant  0.036  0.079 0.070 0.066 
  (1.00)  (2.91) (5.21) (2.98) 
Lag of ΔTFR       0.0423 
       (0.24) 
Δschool expend/cap  -7.920  -20.048  -17.422  -8.503 
  (0.81)  (1.78) (3.31) (1.19) 
Δchild allowance/cap  10.858  11.811  11.732  9.247 
  (1.03)  (1.16) (2.79) (1.29) 
Δchild care  4.228  9.873  8.861  13.524 
  (1.10)  (1.29) (2.92) (2.57) 
level shift 1948  -0.046  -0.082  -0.070  -0.072 
  (1.20)  (2.84) (4.38) (2.91) 
level shift 1964  -0.038  -0.039  -0.043  -0.051 
  (2.10)  (2.40) (4.74) (4.81) 
level shift 1973  0.078  0.066  0.063  0.068 
  (3.17)  (2.13) (4.84) (2.35) 
level shift 1992  -0.128  -0.128  -0.120  -0.104 
  (5.23)  (3.96) (6.89) (2.34) 
 adj R2  0.203  (0.282)  (0.291)  (0.281) 
Hansen J p-value    0.946  0.946  0.865 
Jarque-Bera  p-value  0.013  0.440 0.272 0.198 
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Change in TFR Forecast Model col 3 in Table 1  
Figure 7 Model and projection from the regressions in column 3 of Table 1 
 
The very reasonable out-of-sample projections over a period of 10 years provide 
evidence that our model does contain some useful information, although the model only 
explains some of the variation. In fact, given the observations of age-specific behavior in 
Figure 3 showing that variation in the TFR is related to different age-specific behavior at 
different points in time we should not expect the TFR model to fit very well since shifting 
tempo effects are causing substantial parts of the variation. The good projection is thus partly 
conditional on not too much change in age-specific behavior over this period. 
Regressions of age-specific fertility on public child expenditures 
In order to explain the fertility swings we need to investigate whether the shifts 
in age-specific fertility behavior are consistent with our model framework. The recent decline 
in fertility at young ages and the corresponding increase in older female fertility should be a 
consequence of policies having different impact on different age groups.  
As remarked above we use the TFR specification with the optimized GMM 
specification for TFR for all age-specific regressions. This means that we run a risk of mis-
specification for some age group that could be potentially serious. Our guard against this is 
again to use projections out-of-sample below as a test of the validity. 
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In Table 2 the lag model of column 4 in Table 1 is applied to grouped age-
specific fertility rates in the age groups 15-24, 25-29, 30-34 and 35-49. The same instrument 
set as in Table 1 is used in order to minimize differences in specification. Thus the lag is used 
since the age-specific fertility rates are not part of the instrument set. The choice of groups is 
dictated by the consideration that most of the children are born by mothers between 25 and 34 
and the other age groups are aggregated. The patterns we see are rather intuitive. Mothers 
above 30 are less affected by the quantity-quality effect through school expenditure. The 
estimates indicate that mothers at ages 25-29 seem to be most dependent on cash transfers and 
child care. The level shift of the parental leave reform is most significant for those over 30 
and negative for the youngest. The level shifts are, however, much more modest than in the 
TFR model and will only affect age-specific fertility in the third decimal. Thus we can draw 
the tentative conclusion that most of the trend shifts in TFR are actually caused by relative 
changes in age-specific behavior. That level shifts are mostly significant only indicate that 
they serve the intended purpose of controlling for structural shifts. The Hansen J-statistics do 
not reject the over-identifying restrictions imposed by the GMM model so we have no 
indication of invalid instruments.  
 
Table 2 GMM regressions of grouped average age-specific fertility rates. Absolute t-values 
below coefficient estimates in parentheses. 
Dep var. ΔASFR  15-24 years  25-29 years  30-34 years  35+ years 
      
Lag of ΔASFR  0.395 0.467 0.535 0.525 
  (5.72) (13.57)  (14.28)  (12.75) 
Constant*1000   1.759 0.239 0.186 -0.010 
  (5.04) (0.52) (1.07) (0.09) 
Δschool expend/cap  -0.354 -0.658 -0.167 -0.125 
  (2.44) (5.81) (2.66) (3.14) 
Δchild allowance/cap  0.204 0.669 0.132 0.105 
  (1.06) (6.21) (1.76) (3.35) 
Δchild care/cap  0.284 0.581 0.176 0.158 
  (2.90) (6.20) (4.23) (5.31) 
level shift 1948*1000  -1.349 -0.577 -0.667 0.254 
  (3.57) (1.04) (3.19) (3.35) 
level shift 1964*1000  -0.405 -1.104 0.170  0.235 
  (1.09) (3.09) (1.42) (2.10) 
level shift 1973*1000  -1.313 1.489 0.626 0.407 
  (2.77) (3.55) (5.24) (4.49) 
level shift 1992*1000  -1.062 -1.800 0.358  0.240 
 (2.87)  (5.26)  (1.83)  (1.90) 
dummy 1968  -0.008       
 (3.84)       
dummy 1942    0.012  0.003  0.003 
   (9.94)  (7.48)  (10.24) 
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J-stat p-value  0.988  0.981  0.971  0.976 
J-B p-value  0.427  0.251  0.636  0.476 
 
 
Without the dummies for 1968 (in the estimation for the 15-24 age group) and 
for 1942 (all others) the assumption of normally distributed residuals is rejected. It is mainly 
the hypothesis of zero kurtosis that is rejected indicating overly influential outliers in the 
results that we have dummied out in Table 2. The interpretation of the dummies is that in 
these years we have an isolated deviation from the linear trend. Recalling that we in fact are 
predicting school expenditure and child care expenditure by lags of the variable set there is no 
specific reason why the outlier would be caused by events in the particular dummy year. Most 
likely the negative outlier for below 25 fertility has to do with the introduction of efficient and 
generally available contraceptives (the contraceptive pill and the loop) in the years just before 
1968. Why 1942 stands out as a positive outlier for ages 25 and above is harder to imagine. 
Most of the kids born in 1942 must have been conceived in 1941. Sweden was neutral in 
World War II and the preceding years are highly economically expansive, which may be the 
explanation for rising fertility in spite of the world war. In any case the actual impact of the 
dummies is small. 
The grouped age-specific fertility rates that we have used for the regressions in 
Table 2 are referring to the average one-year ASFR within the age interval. Due to shifts in 
both fertility patterns and variations in the cohort-sizes of the fertile population this average 
will apply to different one-year age classes in the interval over time. This introduces a certain 
fuzziness in the interpretation of the coefficients since it picks up, not only the tempo effects, 
but also variation within the age groups due to cohort-size effects. Using the total fertility rate 
over the same broad age groups instead, we can avoid that fuzziness at the price of a subtly 
different interpretation where the effects refer not to the reaction of the average age class but 
rather to the reaction to policies by the whole age group, without reference to any 
representative age class.  
 
The patterns we see in Table 3 are in many respects similar to Table 2. Mothers 
above 30 are less affected by the quantity-quality effect through school expenditure. The 
estimates now indicate that mothers 30-34 as a group seem most dependent on cash transfers 
but it is still 25-29 that depend most on child care. The level shift of the parental leave reform 
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is most significant for those over 30 and negative for the youngest. The Jarque-Bera tests for 
normality of the residuals have marginally higher p-values. 
 
Table 3 GMM regressions of age-group total fertility rates. Absolute t-values below 
coefficient estimates in parentheses. 
Dep var. ΔATFR  15-24 years  25-29 years  30-34 years  35+ years 
      
Lag of ΔATFR  0.396 0.365 0.532 0.525 
  (5.73) (9.60) (11.92)  (12.79) 
Constant    0.018 0.013 0.001 0.000 
  (5.04) (5.65) (0.57) (0.09) 
Δschool  expend/cap  -3.546 -5.025 -2.162 -1.869 
  (2.44) (4.62) (2.99) (3.14) 
Δchild  allowance/cap  2.076 1.718 3.216 1.550 
  (1.07) (1.44) (4.17) (3.28) 
Δchild  care/cap  2.862 4.738 3.063 2.365 
  (2.89) (5.03) (4.80) (5.30) 
level  shift  1948  -0.013 -0.007 -0.002 -0.004 
  (3.57) (2.67) (0.52) (1.64) 
level  shift  1964  -0.004 -0.014 -0.008 -0.004 
  (1.09) (5.15) (4.79) (2.09) 
level shift 1973  -0.013  0.004  0.008  0.006 
  (2.77) (1.26) (3.56) (4.50) 
level  shift  1992  -0.011 -0.025 -0.011 -0.004 
  (2.84) (6.71) (4.30) (1.93) 
dummy 1968  -0.077     
  (3.84)     
dummy 1942    0.046 0.064 0.048 
   (5.73)  (11.19)  (10.28) 
      
J-stat  p-value  0.988 0.982 0.980 0.976 
J-B  p-value  0.427 0.932 0.671 0.476 
 
 
The fit of both variants (ASFR and ATFR) of these regressions is much better 
than for the TFR regressions. Although the conventional R-square measures are not really 
relevant as statistics for instrumental variables regressions, it can be noted that as compared to 
the TFR case adjusted R-square doubles for the age-specific regressions.  
It is interesting to note that the lag variable becomes insignificant for the two 
older age groups, and it is only weakly correlated for the younger age groups indicating less 
problems with serial correlation than in the TFR case. The better fit within-sample of a 
specification of the model established by exploring TFR correlations may tentatively be 
interpreted as evidence that it is indeed the shifting tempo effects that cause the poor fit of the 
TFR model. 
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However, within-sample fit cannot be decisive for such conclusions. In spite of 
our efforts to get statistically significant correlations with as little bias as possible, it is 
obvious that we have omitted many potentially important variables. In order to verify that our 
regressions contain information useful for prediction we use the same out-of-sample method 
as for TFR above using the actual age class fertilities over the period. This is not a real 
forecast test, since a real forecast would need to predict the child expenditure variables, but it 
does test whether the correlation patterns estimated before 1998 remain stable. 
In Figure 8 the fit of the model with grouped age-specific fertilities over the 
period 1930 to 1997 and the out-of-sample projections 1998-2007 are depicted. For a ten-year 
out-of-sample projection the performance is impressive. Only for the oldest group do we have 
a substantial under-prediction of the changes in age-specific fertility. Considering that we also 










Figure 8 The out-of-sample projections of ASFR 1998-2007 for the four age groups. 
 
In Figure 9 we show the results of the same exercise using age group total 
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Figure 9 The out-of-sample projections of ATFR 1998-2007 for the four age groups. 
 
Considering that it has been regarded as quite hard to predict short-term 
movements in the fertility rates these results are surprising. For long-term forward projections 
expenditure rates themselves have to be predicted, considerably increasing the uncertainty. 
The results may be more helpful for modeling and predicting short- or medium- term effects 
of different policy scenarios if it turns out that our results can be generalized to other contexts. 
6 Discussion and conclusions 
 
The regressions presented here only bear evidence of the partial correlations 
between the variables and is no causal evidence per se. In fact, there is a high likelihood that 
the causal links run in both directions and encompass rather complex macro feedback 
mechanisms. Using instrument variable techniques we are able to fit public expenditure per 
eligible child for school expenditure, child allowances and child care to model changes in age-
specific fertility rates with little sign of bias in the statistics. Low fertility in Sweden has 
frequently motivated increases in family support which in general have been followed by 
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increases in fertility. Instrumentation of the regressions using lagged variables clearly 
indicates that some causal links from expenditure to fertility exists, although not necessarily 
by a direct impact on individual behavior. The policies have somewhat different impact for 
different age groups in a way that is consistent with the delayed fertility patterns that we can 
observe in the Swedish fertility swings. 
The age-specific regressions bear evidence that the partial correlations of age-
specific fertility to the economic environment and the transfer system although homogeneous 
in terms of sign are heterogeneous in terms of strength. This pattern can explain why Swedish 
TFR varies much more strongly than completed cohort fertility. Adaptation in the 
intergenerational transfer system to decreasing birth rates tends to affect age-specific fertility 
in different ways. 
The model exhibits a surprisingly good projection performance ten years ahead 
and out-of-sample. The results promise to be useful in modeling different policy scenarios and 
could conceivably be used in order to avoid further roller-coasting in the Swedish total 
fertility rates by balancing child-related expenditures in an appropriate way. 
It is important to note that we predict changes in the fertility rates and the linear 
trends in the level of fertility are taken as given. Thus the conclusion is that in order to keep 
fertility at a given level child-related expenditure has to be balanced against increasing 
relative child costs (not least the opportunity costs of women). 
It is, of course, untenable to maintain that fertility rates would be affected only 
by the three expenditure variables we have included in the regressions. For example, changes 
in parental leave benefits are left out, as are many other potentially important factors, e.g. 
increasing use of in-vitro fertilization, changing social attitudes towards children and gender 
equality, and so on and so forth. The evidence here should rather be thought of as a reduced 
form that reflects important parts of all the different factors, and not a structural model that 
gives an exhaustive explanation of behavioral mechanisms. The projection performance 
should be thought of as a promising leading indicator approach that may or may not be 
peculiar to the social and political institutions of Sweden. Further research is needed for 
assessing the generality of our conclusions. 
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Appendix: The evolution of social policy in Sweden 
 
In this appendix we give a brief review of major changes in family related 
policies and events in Sweden. We owe Hoem and Hoem (1996) for compiling most of the 
facts below. 
In the 1930s social policies evolve fast in Sweden, although only minor parts 
would count directly as family policy. In 1931 some groups get the right to maternity leave 
and in some cases even modest cash benefits. 1938 some benefit is given to all mothers and 
single mothers receive extra support. In 1939 job security is guaranteed by forbidding 
dismissal due to pregnancy or marriage. It is hard to believe that these minor although 
important reforms caused the later baby boom. However, the whole system of social security 
improves during the 1930s by improved employment protection, social insurance for sickness 
etc. and an economic boom starts in the mid 1930s. 
In the 1940s the military draft of young males provides an increasing female 
labor demand. In 1948 a universal child allowance is introduced when TFR is but remains 
above 2 for the whole 1950s. After World War II both transfers and public consumption 
enters an increasing trend. In 1955 a universal maternity leave for three months with a low 
benefit is introduced. In 1963 this is extended to 6 months with a low earnings related benefit. 
In 1964 the contraceptive pill is introduced and in 1967 the loop. The 1960s are golden years 
in Sweden with high growth rates and rapid urbanization. 
In the 1970s economic problems and crises are common, paid paternity leave 
becomes an option in 1974 and the benefit level increases to 90 percent of earnings and the 
divorce law is liberalized. Separate taxation of spouses already in 1971 changes the 
restrictions on household bargaining. 1975 parental leave is extended to 7 months paid at 90 
percent. 1976 free abortion is introduced. 1977 longer leave for sick children. 1978 parental 
leave is further extended to 8 months with 90 percent pay and one month at a low flat rate. 
1979 parents get the right to part time work (75 percent) as long as children are in pre-school 
age. Child transfers stop increasing in the beginning of the 1980s although in 1980 parental 
leave is further extended to 9 months with replacement and 3 months at a flat rate. At the 
same time a speed premium for having the next child within 24 months is introduced together 
with two months of paid leave to attend to sick children and some other minor changes. 
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In 1982 an extra child allowance is introduced for three or more children and in 
1986 the speed premium period is extended to 30 months. Towards the end of the 1980s child 
transfers are expanding again but this trend is broken in the early 1990s with the Swedish 
economic crisis and also public consumption per child goes down. 1989 parental leave is 
further extended to 12 months paid at 90 percent and 3 months at a low flat rate. Paid leave 
for sick children is extended to 3 months in 1989 and 4 months in 1990. 1995 parents are 
granted the right to part time work when they have children that are 8 years old or below. 
In 1995 benefits for parental leave are limited to 80 percent of regular earnings 
and one month is reserved for the father and one for the mother, while the other 10 months 
can be shared. In 1996 the income replacement rate is further limited to 75 percent. 1998 the 
benefit level was restored to 80 percent. In 2002 two months were reserved for each parent 
and paid leave extended to 13 months. Former Working Papers: 
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